You can't defeat terror by force
By Muli Peleg
Ha'aretz, March 15, 2004
Terror in Spain, Gaza, and various places in the world has succeeded in sowing pain and fear because the Western democracies have not had the wisdom to understand how to deal with it. The policy of anti-terrorism, or counterterrorism, fails again and again. In the best case it is ineffective and in the worst case it creates new cycles and new outbreaks of terror. This continual folly is the result of three conceptual traps, which flourish in nearly every Western nation -- the mind-set of force, the mind-set of reward and punishment, and the mind-set of lost honor.
The first trap is tied to the paradigm of political realism, according to which political moves must be backed by force, and with respect to terrorists, they must be every bit as forceful and violent as those at whom they are aimed. Many world leaders believe that violent retaliation is the only way to deal with terrorists, and a minority believe that maybe one should talk with them, but first they must be "taught a lesson," after which "they must put down their arms," and then maybe it's permissible to listen to them.
A nation has no legal, moral, or organizational difficulty in sending its defense forces on a retaliatory strike. The goal after a terror attack is mainly to psychologically reassure the population, and restore confidence in the system. In a political system with a large contingent of retired military and intelligence personnel, the aggressive respons to terror will be almost automatic.
The second trap is the mind-set of reward and punishment, which abounds in western theological and philosophical traditions. Its source is found in the absolute certainty that whoever commits a crime must be punished. The dichotomy of good and evil, righteous and sinner, believer and heretic, will not tolerate subtleties or ambiguity. The terrorists are evil and you can't talk to them. The desire to restore order, and to give the terrorists their due, obscures the real problem, which is how to prevent the next attack. The longing for revenge or the desire to punish are, like military action, a short-term and illusory solution.
The third pitfall is the sense of lost honor. The nation and its leadership feel that the terrorists have undermined their ability to rule and to protect the citizenry. In countries that suffer serial terrorist attacks, the government's legitimacy is liable to be in questioned eventually, and the authorities will then rush to prop up their legitimacy, often with large-scale military action.
In Madrid and Jerusalem, in Washington and London, they are trapped in a conception of terror vs. terror. Through all of history this has never worked, not in Algeria nor Kenya, not in Ireland and not in Greece. On the contrary, if there is anything that is going to give rise to new terrorists, and provide them with a reason and an opportunity to join a terror organization, it is a violent action against them, preferably a broad, fierce, and prolonged action, so that they will receive the public's support as well.
How, therefore, should we contend with terror? We should treat it as a political and rational phenomenon. An examination of terrorist behavior in its political context is likely to clarify their motivations, their calculations, and their preferences. Thus it will be possible to try to deal with them in a more pragmatic way. Treating the terrorist act as rational, as an act with a goal and means, may even help in preventing the next attack. If the link between the terrorists' means and ends is undermined, causing them to consider alternate means, the likelihood of a repeat attack will be diminished. Of course this is not achieved by retaliatory terror. On the contrary, the government, by adopting exactly the same means as used by the terrorists, encourages the perception that terror is an effective approach in the struggle.
Finally, terror is an extreme way of sending messages. It is carried out by groups who are excluded from the public discourse and legitimate interaction. Therefore, inclusion of all groups in public discourse, even unpopular groups like the extremists of the Basque ETA or Hamas, is essential for eliminating terrorism.
The threatening rhetoric and the total refusal to recognize the state are the first bargaining chips. They will disappear if the government will dare to summon its most bitter enemies to direct talks. Discussion has its own dynamic and is the real and effective cure for the danger of terror.
Dr. Peleg is the Academic Director of the Center for Strategic Dialogue at the Netanya College.
(Translated by Daniel Breslau)